







Free Will, Responsibility, and Determinism
Abstract
An analysis of our commonsense concept of freedom yields two “minimal criteria”: (1) 
Autonomy distinguishes freedom from compulsion; (2) Authorship distinguishes freedom 
from chance. Translating freedom into “self-determination” can account for both criteria. 
Self-determination is understood as determination by “personal-preferences” which are 
constitutive for a person. Freedom and determinism are therefore compatible; the crucial 
question is not whether an action is determined at all but, rather, whether it is determined 
by personal preferences. This account can do justice to the most important intuitions con-
cerning freedom, including the ability to do otherwise. Waiving determination, by contrast, 
would violate the minimal criteria rather than providing “more” freedom. It is concluded 








however,	 the	 view	 that	 indeterminism	 and	 freedom	 might	 be	 incompatible	
has	recently	received	increasing	attention,	too.	Taken	in	isolation,	the	latter	







basic	 commonsense	 concepts	 that	 plays	 a	 constitutive	 role	 in	 our	 view	 of	



















the	 so-called	 “Principle	 of	Alternative	 Possibilities”,	 and	 that	 it	 provides	






analysis	 but	 leads	 to	 a	 conflict	 with	 the	 minimal	 criteria.	 I	 conclude	 that	
the	 self-determination	account	of	 freedom	comes	quite	 close	 to	 a	 “strong	
analysis”.




































































































termination,	namely	external	determination,	seems	 to	 imply	other	 forms	of	




determined,	 just	 for	 conceptual	 reasons.	 I	will	 argue	 that	 this	 remains	 true	
even	if	the	individual	features,	together	with	external	factors,	determine	what	
p	does.
II. Personal Capabilities 











not	 free	 and	 who	 is	 the	 subject	 of	 determination	 or	 compulsion.	A	 second	
important	point	is	that	the	criteria	below	don’t	commit	you	to	any	empirical	























































The	answer	 to	 this	question	 is	of	central	 importance	because	 it	determines	
whether	or	not	the	present	account	goes	beyond	weak	concepts	like	the	tradi-
tional	freedom	of	action	account.	Intuitively,	strong,	stable,	and	well	ground-













Taken	by	 itself,	 this	criterion	 is	clearly	 insufficient:	Compulsions	are	often	





be	 said	 to	 act	 in	 a	 self-determined	 manner	 if	 they	 follow	 those	 principles.	
And	if	you	think	that	moral	principles	can	be	rationally	justified,	then	your	
















if	you are able, in principle, to	respond	to	reasons	as	far	as	this	action	is	con-











Possible Subject to Self-Determination
It	would	seem,	 then,	 that	we	need	an	alternative.	 I	 think	 that	we	have	 two	
possibilities:	 Let’s	 call	 the	 first	 one	 “identificationist”	 and	 the	 second	 one	

































in	a	vicious	circle:	 In	order	 to	determine	whether	 something	qualifies	as	a	
self-determined	decision	we	have	to	appeal	to	personal	preferences,	while	the	
identification	of	personal	preferences,	 in	 turn,	 seems	 to	 require	knowledge	






























decisions	on	behalf	 of	 those	desires	or	 dispositions.	 If	 certain	 areas	 in	my	
brain	light	up	in	an	fMRI	scanner	when	I	hear	a	Verdi-aria,	this	might	indicate	
that	 I	 cannot	make	a	 self-determined	decision	concerning	my	 love	 for	 this	
kind	of	music.	It	is	obvious	that	such	assessments	are	fallible	and	that	there	











out	 that	 this	 liberal	 requirement	 is	particularly	helpful	 for	a	defense	of	 the	
Principle of Alternative Possibilities.	If	my	decision	to	do	x	rather	than	y	in	
situation	c	is	based	on	personal	preferences	that	I	cannot	change,	then	it	seems	
difficult	to	deny	that	I	could	not	have	acted	otherwise.	Although	I’m	not	sure	
that	the	Principle of Alternative Possibilities is	really	incompatible	with	the	
identificationist	position,	 the	principle	seems	at	 least	difficult	 to	defend	on	
such	an	account.	Because	I	think	that	the	Principle of Alternative Possibilities 





















former	has	 a	 certain	position	within	 the	hierarchy	of	 decisions.	Either,	 the	
hierarchical	relation	is	decisive,	but	then	the	second-order	decision	will	need	
a	third-order	decision	in	order	to	qualify	as	free	and	so	forth,	thus	we	would	








This	 is	one	of	 the	reasons	why	I	 think	 that	 the	absence	of	a	hierarchy	 it	 is	
an	advantage	of	the	present	proposal.	The	absence	of	any	hierarchy	follows	
also	from	the	symmetry	between	personal	preferences	and	decisions	concern-




requirement	 is	 that	 the	 result	 of	 a	 self-determined	decision	process	 can	be	
implemented,	no	matter	what	the	result	will	be.














But	 what	 would	 happen,	 if	 one	 of	 the	 notorious	 nefarious	 neurosurgeons	


































intervention.	 I	 think	 that	 this	does	 justice	 to	our	 intuitions.	 It	would	 seem,	
then,	that	the	present	account	can	deal	with	this	thought	experiment	in	a	sa-
tisfactory	way.
III.  Intuitions – The Principle of Alternative 






























sequently,	 the	 statement	 “p	 could	 do	 y in	 situation	 c”	 would	 be	 true	 in	 a	












actly	 the	same	conditions,	 that	 is,	no matter what her dispositions, beliefs, 


































with	the	principle	of	authorship	but	violates	the	Principle of Alternative Pos-
sibilities.	 If	 it	 does	 not	 depend	 upon	 her	 beliefs,	 desires,	 and	 dispositions,	
then	 it	might	comply	with	 the	Principle of Alternative Possibilities	but	 the	
principle	of	authorship	would	be	violated.
It	seems	that	the	agent-causation	account	and	the	underlying	interpretation	of	














































































conditions	c’ if	the	mechanism	intervenes.	It	seems	clear	that	p cannot	do	y 
rather	than	x under	conditions	c’, but	since	he	is	forced	by	the	mechanism,	we	
would	not	say	that	his	action	is	free.	We	have	no	freedom	and	the	Principle 
of Alternative Possibilities is	violated.	But	what	about	conditions	c?	 If	 the	
mechanism	remains	passive,	then	p is	free	and	able	to	do	otherwise	because	
nothing	 will	 prevent	 him	 from	 doing	 so	 unless	 the	 background	 conditions	
change	from	c to	c’. It	 follows	 that	Frankfurt’s	objection	can	be	dismissed	
because	the	alleged	inability	to	do	otherwise	requires	a	change	in	the	back-
ground	conditions	and	thus	ignores	one	of	the	most	important	requirements	of	

















Another Look at the Principle	
of	Alternative	Possibilities
On	reflection	however,	doubts	arise	whether	the	above	reading	of	the	Princi-


















so	far	 in	 this	section.	The	problem	with	 this	option	 is	 that	 if	 it	was	p’s	ac-










Since	interpretation	(a)	treats	the	Principle of Alternative Possibilities in	such	
a	way	that	it	looses	its	relevance	for	the	question	whether	or	not	an	action	is	
free,	 it	 does	not	 comply	with	 the	criterion	mentioned	above,	 thus	 it	 seems	
justified	to	dismiss	it.	So	what	about	interpretation	(b)?	It	seems	that,	on	this	










































































































































































closest	 friends.	Still,	 the	decision	might	be	explained	with	reference	 to	my	
personal	preferences,	say,	because	there	was	a	hidden	dynamics	within	these	
preferences	that	led	to	this	decision.
IV. Freedom and Determinism
It	would	seem,	then,	that	there	is	considerable	evidence	that	the	present	ac-
count	is	strong	enough	to	do	justice	to	some	of	the	most	widely	shared	intui-






and	 determinism	 can	 be	 rejected.	 Nevertheless	 I	 think	 that	 it	 is	 useful	 do	








































ences	takes	place	immediately before the decision. Again,	the	decision	is	not	
determined	by	events	that	happened	before	p’s	birth;	in	addition	we	can	reject	
the	first	premise	of	 the	Consequence-Argument because	 the	relevant	action	
can	not	be	regarded	anymore	as	the	“consequence	of	the	laws	of	nature	and	
events	in	the	remote	past.”	However,	since	there	is	no	interval	between	the	













































it	 is	 this	 act	 of	 belief	 that	 is	 not	 determined	 and,	 consequently,	 cannot	 be	
predicted.	But	since	 the	eventual	decision	can	 tell	us	whether	 the	moral	or	
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Selbstbestimmung
Freier Wille, Verantwortung und Determinismus
Zusammenfassung
Eine Analyse unseres auf dem gesunden Menschenverstand beruhenden Freiheitskonzeptes er-
gibt zwei „minimale Kriterien“: 1) Autonomie bedeutet einen Unterschied zwischen Freiheit 
und Zwang; 2) Urheberschaft bedeutet einen Unterschied zwischen Freiheit und Zufall. Die 
Auslegung von Freiheit als „Selbstbestimmung“ kann für beide Kriterien in Anspruch genom-
men werden. „Selbstbestimmung“ wird verstanden als Bestimmung anhand „persönlicher Vor-
lieben“, die für die betreffende Person konstituierend sind. Freiheit und Determinismus sind 
also kompatibel. Die Schlüsselfrage ist nicht, ob unser Handeln überhaupt determiniert ist, 
sondern eher, ob dies durch persönliche Vorlieben geschieht. Diese Erklärung kann den mei-
sten freiheitsbezogenen Intuitionen gerecht werden, einschließlich der Fähigkeit, anders [als 
gewohnt] zu handeln. Im Gegensatz dazu würde der Verzicht auf eine Determinierung eher 
das genannte Minimalkriterium verletzen, als „mehr“ Freiheit zu ermöglichen. Der Verfasser 
kommt zum Schluss, dass Selbstbestimmung die Verwirklichung aller unserer Ansprüche ermög-





Libre arbitre, Responsabilité et Déterminisme
Résumé
L’analyse de la conception commune de la liberté produit deux « critères minimaux » : 1) 
L’autonomie distingue la liberté de la contrainte ; 2) La responsabilité distingue la liberté 
du hasard. Interpréter la liberté comme « autodétermination » correspond aux deux critères. 
L’autodétermination se comprend comme une détermination par les « préférences personnel-
les », constitutives de la personne. La liberté et le déterminisme sont ainsi compatibles. La 
question essentielle n’est pas de savoir si une action est déterminée ou pas, mais plutôt de savoir 
si elle est déterminée par les préférences personnelles. Cette explication est juste à l’égard des 
intuitions les plus importantes concernant la liberté, y compris le pouvoir d’agir autrement. 
Abandonner la détermination, par contraste, violerait les critères minimaux au lieu de procurer 
« davantage » de liberté. Dans la conclusion, il est indiqué que l’autodétermination procure 
tout ce qu’on peut demander si on demande la liberté. 
Mots-clés
libre	arbitre,	autodétermination,	responsabilité,	déterminisme,	possibilités	alternatives
